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Abstract
Many have claimed that epistemic rationality sometimes requires us to have impre-
cise credal states (i.e., credal states representable only by sets of credence functions)
rather than precise ones (i.e., credal states representable by single credence func-
tions). Some writers have recently argued that this claim conflicts with accuracy-
centered epistemology, i.e., the project of justifying epistemic norms by appealing
solely to the overall accuracy of the doxastic states they recommend. But these
arguments are far from decisive. In this essay, we prove some new results, which
show that there is little hope for reconciling the rationality of credal imprecision
with accuracy-centered epistemology.
1. Introduction
Let an agent have precise credences if and only if her doxastic state can be rep-
resented by a single credence function that assigns numerical values to various
propositions. The value that a credence function assigns to a proposition reflects
the agent’s degree of belief or her confidence in that proposition. Though this way
of representing doxastic states has several advantages,1 many have argued that we
ought to reject it. Instead, they have proposed an imprecise model of doxastic
states: on this picture, an agent’s doxastic state is not represented by a single cre-
dence function, but rather by a set of credence functions called a representor by van
Fraassen (1990). This view comes in two varieties. The first is the descriptive claim
that, given their limited cognitive capacities, human beings like us can’t possibly
have precise credences.2 The second is the normative claim that there are certain
scenarios where agents are permitted and required by epistemic rationality not to
have precise credences.3
A standard motivation for the second claim comes from cases of non-specific
evidence. Consider the following example:
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MYSTERY COIN. You have a coin that was made at a factory where they can make
coins of pretty much any bias. You have no idea whatsoever what bias your coin
has. What should your credence be that when you toss the coin, it will land
heads?4
How should the defender of precise credences answer this question? She could
say that you should assign a credence of 0.5 to the proposition that the coin will
land heads. But some find this answer to be problematic. For them, if you were
rationally certain that the coin was fair, then you could indeed rationally adopt a
precise credence of 0.5. Or, if you had precise rational degrees of belief about what
the possible biases of the coin are, and if the expected chance of the coin landing
heads in light of those degrees of belief were 0.5, then you could rationally assign
a credence of 0.5 to the relevant proposition. But in this case, your evidence is
non-specific: you have no evidence about the outcome of the coin flip other than
the evidence that the chance distribution over the two outcomes of the coin flip
could be anything. In the absence of any specific information whatsoever about the
bias of the coin, assigning a sharp credence of 0.5 is irrational. For the defender of
imprecise credences, non-specific evidence warrants non-specific credal states. So,
the appropriate doxastic attitude to adopt in this example is a set of those credences
that are compatible with the possible objective chances of the coin landing heads
given your evidence.5 This might indeed be the entire unit interval [0,1]. Thus, your
doxastic state should be representable by a set of credence functions which assign
these values to the relevant proposition.
To fix ideas for the purposes of this paper, let an agent’s total evidence with
respect to a partition X (where a partition is a set of mutually exclusive and ex-
haustive propositions) be non-specific if and only if, for some non-singleton set of
probability functions C, the only evidence an agent has concerning the propositions
in X is that the objective chance function for X is in C. Our verdict about MYSTERY
COIN motivates the following principle.
Requirement of Imprecision. Suppose an agent’s doxastic state is defined over a
partition X. If the agent’s total evidence is non-specific with respect to X, then
the agent is required by epistemic rationality to adopt an imprecise credal state
with respect to the propositions in X.
Recently, Schoenfield (2015) has given an argument (also presented in a different
form by Seidenfeld, Schervish, and Kadane (2012) and Mayo-Wilson and Wheeler
(2016)) that Requirement of Imprecision cannot be reconciled with accuracy-centered
epistemology, i.e., the approach to epistemology on which requirements of epistemic
rationality must be justified by appealing to accuracy-based considerations alone.
Schoenfield shows that given certain plausible assumptions about measures of ac-
curacy, for any imprecise credal state that is defined over a two-cell partition over
the possibility space, there is a precise credal state that matches it with respect to
accuracy. Since an agent cannot be required to have such an imprecise credal state
from an accuracy-centered standpoint, Requirement of Imprecision is false.
However, Schoenfield’s argument doesn’t rule out the possibility that from an
accuracy-centered standpoint, (i) in situations of non-specific evidence like MYSTERY
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COIN, an agent may always be rationally permitted to adopt imprecise credal states,
and (ii) in some of those cases, at least, she may even be rationally required to adopt
imprecise credal states. In particular, the following claims might still be true:
Permission for Imprecision. Suppose an agent’s doxastic state is defined over a
partition X. If the agent’s total evidence is non-specific with respect to X, then
the agent is permitted by epistemic rationality to adopt an imprecise credal state
with respect to the propositions in X.
Weak Requirement of Imprecision. There are some bodies of non-specific evi-
dence E such that if an agent’s total evidence is E, then, for some partition X,
she is required by epistemic rationality to adopt an imprecise credal state with
respect to the propositions in X.
Requirement of Imprecision, when combined with other assumptions, entails these
claims.6 But these claims can also be independently motivated on the basis of
cases like MYSTERY COIN. For example, in MYSTERY COIN, you cannot be required
to adopt any sharp credence about the outcome of the coin flip. In particular,
since all that you know is that the objective chance of heads coming up is in
the set [0,1], it is permissible for you to make an imprecise credal assignment of
[0,1] to the proposition that the coin will land heads. This consideration supports
Permission for Imprecision. Moreover, under ordinary circumstances, our attitudes
are defined over sets of propositions much more complex than a two-cell partition
of the possibility space. If we intuitively understand MYSTERY COIN as a case of that
sort, then we may indeed be correct in thinking that there is a rational requirement
to adopt an imprecise credal state in this scenario. This supportsWeak Requirement
of Imprecision.
In this essay, we argue that the defender of imprecise credences cannot easily
reconcile Weak Requirement of Imprecision and Permission for Imprecision with
accuracy-centered epistemology. We show that the following two claims come out
true given certain constraints on measures of accuracy: (i) for any imprecise credal
state, there is a precise credal state that is just as accurate, and (ii) many impre-
cise credal states that are predicted to be rational by a natural precisification of
Permission for Imprecision are in fact accuracy-dominated by precise credal states,
i.e., guaranteed to do worse accuracy-wise than some precise credal states. If (i) is
true, Weak Requirement of Imprecision cannot be accommodated within accuracy-
centered epistemology; if (ii) is true, there will be a tension between Permission for
Imprecision and accuracy-centered epistemology. Since the constraints we impose
on measures of accuracy are not easy to reject, we end up with the conclusion
that there is no easy way of accommodating the rationality of imprecise credences
within an accuracy-centered approach to epistemology.
Here is how we shall proceed. First, we will present Schoenfield’s argument
against Requirement of Imprecision (§1). Then, we will show how her argument fails
to rule out the possibility that the accuracy-centered epistemologist can accommo-
date Weak Requirement of Imprecision and Permission for Imprecision (§2). Then,
we will show that given certain plausible constraints on measures of accuracy, we
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cannot easily reconcile these two theses with accuracy-centered epistemology (§§3-
4). Next, we shall consider three responses to this argument, all of which involve
rejecting one or more of these constraints on measures of accuracy (§§5-7). We go
on to argue that none of these responses can easily succeed.
2. Accuracy and Credal Imprecision
In this section, we introduce accuracy-centered epistemology, and present an argu-
ment given by Schoenfield (2015) that makes trouble for Requirement of Imprecision.
2.1 Accuracy-centered epistemology
Accuracy-centered epistemology is a species of epistemic utility theory. Epistemic
utility theory has two aims. On the one hand, it seeks to articulate a conception of
epistemic value that explains what makes one doxastic state more valuable from an
epistemic standpoint than another. On the other hand, it seeks to explain why cer-
tain requirements of epistemic rationality have the force that they have, by showing
that conforming to them is the best means towards promoting the relevant kind of
epistemic value.
Accuracy-centered epistemologists think that the only source of epistemic value
for credal states (i.e., doxastic states representable by credence functions or sets of
credence functions) is the gradational accuracy of the credences they involve, i.e.,
their proximity to the truth.7 This view is sometimes called Credal Veritism. For
example, the epistemic value of a doxastic state that is representable by a single
credence function will depend on the gradational accuracy of the credences it as-
signs to various propositions, where the gradational accuracy of a credence in a
true proposition is higher when the credence is closer to 1, while the gradational
accuracy of a credence in a false proposition is higher when the credence is closer
to 0. Using this conception of epistemic value, accuracy-centered epistemologists
argue that various epistemic norms, such as Probabilism (the norm of having prob-
abilistically coherent credences) and Conditionalization (the norm of adopting as
posteriors one’s prior conditional probabilities), can be shown to cohere with the
instrumentally rational pursuit of accuracy.8 That explains why these norms have
the force that they seem to have.
Accuracy-centered epistemologists assess the accuracy of precise credal states
(i.e., doxastic states representable by single credence functions) using measures of
accuracy. Suppose W is a set of worlds, such that any set P of worlds in W is a
proposition. Let X = {P1, P2, P3, . . . } be a partition over W, where each cell Pi in
X is a proposition. Let BX be the set of all credence functions defined over X.9 The
accuracy of a credence function b in BX is measured by a precise global accuracy
measure GX: BX × W → [0,1], which maps a credence function b in BX and a world
w in W to a real value GX(b,w) between 0 and 1.
There is a lot of discussion in the literature about which measures of accuracy are
best suited to assess the accuracy of an agent’s credal state. Instead of engaging in
any such discussion, we will take the following three properties of global accuracy
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measures for granted. Relative to any partition X over a set of worlds W, if GX is a
legitimate global accuracy measure for credence functions defined over X, then
(1) Upper Bound. For any w in W and any proposition P in X, if w is in P, then
GX will assign the maximal accuracy score of 1 to any credence function b
that assigns 1 to P and 0 to every other proposition in X.
(2) Lower Bound. For any w in W and any proposition P in X, if w is in P, then
GX will assign the minimal accuracy score of 0 to any credence function b
that assigns 0 to P and 1 to every other proposition in X.
(3) Continuity. GX will be continuous through the space of probability functions,
in the sense that, for any w in W, small differences in credence functions
defined over X should result in small differences in the accuracy score of
those credence functions in w.
2.2 Measuring the accuracy of imprecise credal states
This framework is only suitable for measuring the accuracy of precise credal states.
How do we, then, measure the accuracy of imprecise credal states, i.e., doxastic
states that aren’t representable by single credence functions? The answer is simple:
we introduce global accuracy measures that take as input not individual credence
functions, but rather sets of credence functions. In other words, we define a new
imprecise global accuracy measure GX*: ℘(BX) × W → [0,1] (where ℘(BX) is the
power set of BX) which takes a set of credence functions C and a world w in W as
input and outputs an accuracy score GX*(C, w).
Schoenfield (2015) proposes three constraints that such imprecise accuracy mea-
sures should satisfy, and we add a fourth to make her argument work within our
framework.
The first constraint is:
Extension. For any set of worlds W and a partition X over W, if GX* is a
legitimate imprecise global accuracy measure for sets of credence functions
defined over X, then there exists a legitimate global accuracy measure GX for
credence functions such that GX* is an extension of GX.
In other words, for any b in BX, the accuracy score that GX* assigns to the
singleton set {b} in a world w is the same as the accuracy score that GX assigns
to b in w: i.e., GX*({b},w) = GX(b,w).
Extension is motivated by the idea that if a method of measuring the accuracy of
imprecise credal states is to be legitimate, it should be consistent with at least one
legitimate way of measuring the accuracy of precise credal states.
The second constraint is:
Boundedness. For any set of worlds W and a partition X over W, if GX* is
a legitimate imprecise global accuracy measure for sets of credence functions
defined over X, then GX* always assigns a real value between 0 and 1 (inclusive).
In particular, for any w in W and any b in BX,
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(i) GX*({b},w) = 1 iff for any P in X, (i) if w is in P, then b(P) = 1 and (ii) if
w is not in P, then b(P) = 0.
(ii) GX*({b},w) = 0 iff for any P in X, (i) if w is in P, then b(P) = 0 and (ii) if
w is not in P, then b(P) = 1.
Boundedness is motivated by two ideas. The first is the idea that, just like legitimate
global accuracy measures for precise credences, legitimate imprecise accuracy mea-
sures must also output real values; otherwise, given Extension, it will be difficult to
compare the accuracy of imprecise credal states with precise ones. The second is the
idea that, even for imprecise credal states, there seems to be a maximally accurate
credal state and a minimally accurate credal state for every possible world. The
maximally accurate one is the one that assigns credence 1 to all those propositions
that are true in that world and 0 to all those propositions that are false in that
world, while the minimally accurate one is the one that assigns credence 1 to all
those propositions that are false in that world and 0 to all those propositions that
are true in that world.
The third constraint is:
Probabilistic Admissibility. For any set of worlds W and a partition X over W,
if GX* is a legitimate imprecise global accuracy measure for sets of credence
functions defined over X, then for any set C of probability functions in BX, there
is no set C* of credence functions in BX such that C is weakly accuracy-dominated
by C* according to GX*.
In other words, there is no set C* in BX such that
(i) for every world w in W, GX*(C,w)  GX*(C*,w), and
(ii) there exists a world w in W such that GX*(C,w) < GX*(C*,w).10
Probabilistic Admissibility captures the thought that a legitimate global measure
of accuracy shouldn’t allow a probabilistic credal state to be weakly accuracy-
dominated by other credal states. One reason for this is that, intuitively, for every
probabilistic credal state, an agent could have some body of evidence that would
make it rationally permissible for her to have that credal state. For example, for
any set of probability functions C defined over a partition X, she could always
get evidence that the objective chance distribution over X lies in that set C. Then,
provided she has no further information about the propositions in X, it would be
rationally permissible for the agent to adopt C as her imprecise credal state. But,
if C is weakly accuracy-dominated by some other set C*, then, from an accuracy-
centered standpoint, it would be rationally impermissible for an agent to adopt it.11
The final constraint (which we need to prove Schoenfield’s result within our
framework) is:
World-Invariance. For any set of worlds W and a partition X over W, if GX*
is a legitimate imprecise global accuracy measure for sets of credence functions
defined over X, then for any two worlds w and w*, if w and w* are in the
same cell of the partition X, then, for any set C of credence functions in BX,
GX(C, w) = GX(C, w*).12
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World-Invariance says that if two worlds w and w* assign the same truth-values to
the same propositions in a partition, then a credal state defined over that partition
should have the same accuracy score in the two worlds. In other words, the accuracy
of a credal state depends completely on the truth-values of the propositions that it
is defined over: the accuracy score of the same credal state shouldn’t differ from one
world to another unless the worlds assign different truth-values to the propositions
over which the credal state is defined.
2.3 Schoenfield’s result
Schoenfield (2015) begins with a principle about epistemic rationality that seems
to fall out of accuracy-centered epistemology. Credal Veritists are committed to the
thesis that gradational accuracy is the only source of epistemic value for credal
states. Most of them also assume that an agent can be required by epistemic ratio-
nality to adopt a credal state D rather than a credal state D* only if D gives the
agent a better shot at having accurate credences than D*. Thus, they are committed
to the following principle:
The Permission Principle. For any credal stateD, if, according to every legitimate
global accuracy measure, there exists a credal state D* that is no less accurate
than D in every (epistemically) possible world, then there can be no rational
requirement to adopt D.13
Schoenfield shows that if we accept the Permission Principle, we must give up
Requirement of Imprecision.
In particular, she proves the following claim.
Proposition 1. For any set of worlds W and a two-cell partition X over W, let C
be a set of probability functions in BX (the set of credence functions defined over
X). If Extension, Boundedness, Probabilistic Admissibility, andWorld-Invariance are
true, then, for any legitimate imprecise global accuracy measure GX*, there will be a
probability function b in BX such that, for any w in W, GX*(C,w) = GX*({b}, w).14
If we grant that Extension, Boundedness, Probabilistic Admissibility, and World-
Invariance are correct, then Schoenfield has shown us that, for any imprecise credal
state defined over a two-cell partition of the possibility space, there is a precise
credal state which matches it with respect to accuracy.
To illustrate the main idea behind the proof, consider the case of MYSTERY COIN.
In that example, there are just two propositions we care about: the proposition H
(i.e., the set of worlds where the coin lands heads) and the proposition T (i.e., the
set of worlds where the coin lands tails). So {H, T} is the two-cell partition (over a
set of worlds W) over which the agent’s credal state is defined. Now, the defender
of Requirement of Imprecision may be committed to thinking that in MYSTERY COIN,
an agent who has no evidence about the bias of the coin is required to have an
imprecise probabilistic credal state over {H, T}. Let this imprecise probabilistic
credal state be represented by a set of probability functions C. Schoenfield then
shows that there is a precise probability function b that is just as accurate as C
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in every world. Her argument goes like this. Let GX* be any legitimate imprecise
global accuracy measure and let GX*(C,wh) = r for any wh in H. By Boundedness,
Extension, and Continuity, we can show that there is a singleton set of a probability
function {b} such that GX*({b},wh) = r for all wh in H. So, {b} is just as accurate as
C in every H-world according to GX*. But then {b} will also have to be as accurate
as C in every T-world wt according to GX*. Otherwise, either {b} or C will (weakly)
accuracy-dominate the other and thereby violate Probabilistic Admissibility. But,
then, since {H,T} is a partition, {b} is just as accurate as C in every world according
to GX*.
What Proposition 1 shows is that provided we accept the relevant constraints on
global accuracy measures for imprecise credences, for any imprecise probabilistic
credal state defined over {H, T}, there is a precise probabilistic credal state which
is just as accurate as the imprecise one. So, by the Permission Principle, the agent
cannot rationally be required to adopt the imprecise doxastic state in that scenario.
Hence, Requirement of Imprecision is false.
Proposition 1 might also lead to a tension between Requirement of Imprecision
and accuracy-centered epistemology in another way. Many authors accept the fol-
lowing constraint on global accuracy measures.
Strict Immodesty. If a rational agent assesses the epistemic value of various
credal states in light of her own credal state according to a legitimate global
accuracy measure, she should come to regard her own credal state as uniquely
optimal, or as giving her the uniquely best shot at having accurate doxastic
states.
The main idea behind Strict Immodesty is that a rational agent takes her doxastic
state to be better than all others from an epistemic standpoint. When we are
concerned solely about precise credal states, Strict Immodesty is sometimes spelled
out as the requirement of strict propriety on precise global accuracy measures: any
legitimate precise global accuracy measure GX must be such that, for any probability
function p defined over X, the expected accuracy of p according to p itself should
be greater than the expected accuracy of any other credence function b according
to p.15
Proposition 1 demonstrates that no legitimate accuracy measure for imprecise
credences can satisfy Extension, Boundedness, Probabilistic Admissibility, World-
Invariance, and Strict Immodesty: if Extension, Boundedness, Probabilistic Admis-
sibility, World-Invariance are correct, then an agent who has an imprecise credal
state defined over a two-cell partition will find another precise doxastic state to be
just as accurate as her own at every world. According to Strict Immodesty, such an
agent cannot be rational. If we want to accommodate Strict Immodesty (as well as
these other constraints on measures of accuracy) and assume that epistemic ratio-
nality does not lay down conflicting requirements, we should reject the idea that an
agent can be required (or even permitted) by epistemic rationality to have imprecise
doxastic states defined over two-cell partitions over the possibility space. Thus, Re-
quirement of Imprecision must be false. Seidenfeld, Schervish, and Kadane (2012)
Accuracy and Credal Imprecision 9
and Mayo-Wilson and Wheeler (2016) prove similar results with slightly different
assumptions for agents who only have doxastic attitudes towards one proposition.
3. Responses
In conjunction with the Permission Principle or Strict Immodesty, Schoenfield’s
result entails that, given certain plausible constraints on measures of accuracy, an
accuracy-centered epistemologist cannot accept Requirement of Imprecision. In this
section, we show that Schoenfield’s result fails to rule out Weak Requirement of
Imprecision and Permission for Imprecision.
3.1 Weak Requirement of Imprecision
It is hard to miss a certain feature of Schoenfield’s result: it deals with a scenario
where an agent’s doxastic state only assigns credences to two propositions. This
makes it difficult to see how it bears on versions of MYSTERY COIN where an agent
has doxastic attitudes not only towards the two possible outcomes of the coin flip,
but also towards other propositions. Consider a version of the scenario where the
agent additionally has doxastic attitudes towards propositions about the chances
of the two outcomes. In fact, one might think that this indeed is the more accurate
description of the case: it is because the agent cannot really form any precise opinion
about the bias of the coin that she cannot form a precise degree of belief about
the outcomes of the coin flip. Therefore, her doxastic attitudes toward the chance-
propositions are relevant to her doxastic attitudes regarding the outcomes of the
coin flip.
Now, it is by no means obvious that Schoenfield’s proof can be generalized
to such examples. The proof crucially relies on the premise that for two sets of
probability functions C and C*, if, for any heads-world wh, C and C* are equally
accurate in wh, then, for any tails-world wt,C andC* also have to be equally accurate
in wt (or else either C or C* would be weakly accuracy-dominated). In other words,
for any heads-world wh and any tails-world wt, if GX*(C,wh) = GX*(C*,wh), then
GX*(C,wt) = GX*(C*,wt). But in a scenario where an agent also has beliefs about
the bias of the coin, let the partition be {FH, FT, BH, BT}, where FH and FT
together include all and only those worlds where the coin is fair, while BH and BT
include all and only those worlds where it is biased towards heads or tails. Now, the
mere fact that, for any FH-world wfh, GX*(C,wfh) = GX*(C*,wfh), implies nothing
about how C and C* should score in worlds where FH isn’t true. It is, for example,
perfectly plausible that, for some FT-world wft, GX*(C,wft) > GX*(C*,wft), as long
as C does worse than C* in some of the worlds where BH or BT are true. Therefore,
Schoenfield’s argument does not by itself show that there cannot be any accuracy-
related reasons to adopt an imprecise doxastic state in cases where our doxastic
states are defined over a more finely grained partition over the set of possible worlds
(which we take it happens all the time).
Hence, the defender of imprecise credences may bite the bullet on the case that
Schoenfield’s proof deals with, and say that in cases where an agent’s doxastic
state is defined over a two-cell partition, the agent isn’t rationally required to
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adopt imprecise credences. However, she might insist that there are other cases
where an agent whose credal state is defined over a more complex partition is
required by epistemic rationality to adopt imprecise credences. Hence, even if the
Permission Principle is correct, Weak Requirement of Imprecision can still be true
with respect to imprecise credal states defined over partitions with more than two
cells. This is significant: since, ordinarily, our doxastic states are defined over such
complex partitions, we may think that, when saddled with non-specific evidence of
the relevant kind, we are often required by epistemic rationality to have imprecise
credences.
3.2 Permission for Imprecision
Now, one might point out that even though Schoenfield’s argument (when combined
with the Permission Principle) doesn’t rule out Weak Requirement of Imprecision,
it does create trouble for Permission for Imprecision when combined with Strict
Immodesty. For the argument predicts that in a case like MYSTERY COIN where the
agent has non-specific evidence and adopts a credal state defined over a two-cell
partition, if the credal state in question is imprecise, the agent will violate the
requirement laid down by Strict Immodesty. But if Permission for Imprecision is
correct, then it is indeed rationally permissible for the agent to adopt an imprecise
credal state under such circumstances. So, there is a conflict between what Permis-
sion for Imprecision allows and what Strict Immodesty requires. Hence, if we accept
Strict Immodesty, we would have to say that Permission for Imprecision is false. But
intuitively, it seems that, given how limited her information about the bias of the
coin is, the agent wouldn’t be violating any requirement of rationality if she were
to adopt an imprecise credal state in that scenario!
However, the argument from Strict Immodesty isn’t persuasive. As Mayo-Wilson
and Wheeler (2016) note, the traditional justification for Strict Immodesty, due
to de Finetti (1937), is that accuracy measures that satisfy Strict Immodesty are
pragmatically valuable to the inquirer: if a rational agent estimates the value of her
doxastic state according to a strictly immodest measure of accuracy, she will always
prefer to report her actual doxastic state rather than some other state (because
she expects it to lead to the best results). This pragmatic justification may not be
convincing to someone who wants to know why from a purely epistemic standpoint
a rational agent should use strictly immodest measures of accuracy. The other
philosophical motivation that Joyce (2009) mentions for Strict Immodesty is that
violations of this constraint give rise to Moore-paradoxical situations in which an
agent adopts a certain doxastic state but thinks some other doxastic state would be
better from an epistemic standpoint. But this only motivates a weaker requirement:
Mild Immodesty. If a rational agent assesses the epistemic value of various credal
states in light of her own credal state according to a legitimate global accuracy
measure, she shouldn’t come to regard her own credal state as suboptimal, or as
giving her a worse shot at having accurate doxastic states, in comparison with
other doxastic states.
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Now, note that Mild Immodesty, when combined with Proposition 1 and the other
constraints on global measures of accuracy, doesn’t predict that it is rationally
impermissible for the agent to adopt an imprecise credal state with respect to
a two-cell partition. In a case where an agent adopts an imprecise credal state
with respect to a two-cell partition, if the agent measures the accuracy of doxastic
states according to a mildly immodest measure of accuracy, she will think that
her imprecise credal state is just as good as another precise credal state, but won’t
think it is worse than the precise credal state. So, it may indeed be rationally
permissible to have that imprecise credal state. Thus, Permission for Imprecision
can still be true. This, in turn, may help us preserve the intuition that in a case
like MYSTERY COIN where our evidence is non-specific, we aren’t doing anything
rationally impermissible in adopting imprecise credences.
In this section, we have shown that even though Schoenfield’s argument rules
out Requirement of Imprecision, it leaves open the possibility that an accuracy-
centered epistemologist can acceptWeak Requirement of Imprecision and Permission
for Imprecision. In the next part of this essay, we offer a new argument to show
that given certain plausible constraints on measures of accuracy,Weak Requirement
of Imprecision and Permission for Imprecision cannot be reconciled with accuracy-
centered epistemology.
4. Local Accuracy Measures
Before we offer our argument, we need some additional assumptions. In particular
we think that it is important to pay special attention to the distinction between
local measures of accuracy (the measures of accuracy for credal assignments that
an agent makes to individual propositions) and global measures of accuracy (i.e.,
the measures of accuracy for entire credal states), and the idea that there has to be
some connection between the two.
4.1 Measuring the local accuracy of precise credal assignments
Recall our earlier definition of global accuracy measures for precise credal states.
Given a partition X over a set of worlds W, a global accuracy measure GX takes
as input any credence function b defined over X and a world w, and outputs the
accuracy score of b in w. Standardly, the global accuracy of a credence function
b in a world w is thought to depend on the accuracy score of the credence that it
assigns to each proposition P in the partition X. To measure the accuracy score of
each credal assignment to a proposition, we need local measures of accuracy.
In order to define local measures of accuracy, we need another notion. For any
world w in a set of worldsW, let an alethic vindication function vw: ℘(W) → {0, 1}
be a function from a proposition P to 0 and 1 such that, for any proposition P,
vw(P) = 1 iff w is in P and vw(P) = 0 iff w is not in P. Intuitively, the alethic
vindication function outputs the truth-value of a proposition at a particular world.
If the world belongs to a proposition, then the proposition is true, and therefore
the truth-value is represented by 1. If the world doesn’t belong to a proposition,
the proposition is false, and therefore the truth-value is represented by 0.
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Now, we can say what local measures of accuracy are. A precise local measure of
accuracy L: [0,1] × {0,1} → [0,1] takes as input (i) any credence b(P) assigned to
a proposition P and (ii) the truth-value of P at a world w, given by vw(P). It then
outputs a real value L(b(P), vw(P)) between 0 and 1. If we evaluate b(P) at a world
w where P is true, the local accuracy of b(P) in that state is given by L(b(P),1) (since
w is in P). If we evaluate b(P) at some other world w* where P is false, the local
accuracy of b(p) in that state will be given by L(b(p),0) (since w is not in P).
We shall assume that precise local measures of accuracy are subject to the fol-
lowing constraints. If L is a legitimate local measure of accuracy, then
(1) Upper Bound. If a proposition P is true (/false), then a credal assignment of
1 (/0) to P should have the maximal accuracy score of 1. In other words,
L(1,1) = L(0,0) = 1.
(2) Lower Bound. If a proposition P is true (/false), then a credal assignment
of 0 (/1) to P should have the minimal accuracy score of 0. In other words,
L(0,1) = L(1,0) = 0.
(3) Continuity. The functions L(.,0) and L(.,1) are continuous through the unit in-
terval [0,1], in the sense that small differences in the inputs to these functions
should result in small differences in their outputs.
(4) Truth-Directedness. For any precise credal assignments r1 and r2 in [0,1],
(i) If |1-r1|<|1-r2|, then L(r1, 1)>L(r2, 1), and
(ii) If |0-r1|<|0-r2|, then L(r1, 0)>L(r2, 0).16
Here, Upper Bound, Lower Bound, and Continuity are similar to the constraints we
imposed on legitimate global measures of accuracy. Truth-Directedness captures the
natural thought that, from an accuracy-centered standpoint, if one credence r1 is
closer to the actual truth-value of a proposition than another credence r2, then r1
should have a better accuracy score than r2.
4.2 Measuring the local accuracy of imprecise credal assignments
Next, we define local accuracy measures for imprecise credal assignments. An im-
precise local accuracy measure L*: ℘([0,1]) × {0,1} → [0,1] is a function that maps
a set of credences assigned to a proposition and the truth-value of that proposition
to a number between 0 and 1. Suppose we are dealing with an imprecise credal
state defined over a partition X over the set of worlds W. Suppose this credal state
is represented by a set of credence functions C. Then, for any proposition P in X,
let the set of credences that this credal state assigns to P be C(P) = {b(P): b  C}.
So, the local accuracy of C(P) in a world w will be L*(C(P),vw(P)).
We impose the following constraints on imprecise local accuracy measures.
Local Extension. If L* is a legitimate imprecise local accuracy measure, then
there exists a legitimate precise local accuracy measure L such that L* is an
extension of L.
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In other words, for any real number r between 0 and 1 and any truth-value v,
L*({r}, v) = L(r,v).
Like Extension, Local Extension is motivated by the idea that local accuracy mea-
sures for imprecise credal assignments should be consistent with the manner in
which we measure the accuracy of precise credal assignments.
The second constraint is:
Local Boundedness. If L* is a legitimate imprecise local accuracy measure, then
it only assigns real values between 0 and 1 (inclusive).
In particular, for any set of credences R,
(i) L*(R, 0) = 1 iff R = {0} and L*(R,1) = 1 iff R = {1}.
(ii) L*(R, 0) = 0 iff R = {1} and L*(R,1) = 0 iff R = {0}.
Like Boundedness, Local Boundedness is motivated by two ideas. The first is the idea
that, just like legitimate local accuracy measures for precise credences, legitimate
local imprecise accuracy measures must also output real values; otherwise, given
Local Extension, it will be difficult to compare the accuracy of imprecise credal
assignments with precise ones. The second idea is that, even for imprecise credal
assignments, there seems to be a maximally accurate credal assignment and a mini-
mally accurate credal assignment for every proposition given its actual truth-value.
When the proposition is true, the credal assignment that has maximal accuracy is
the one that assigns a precise credence of 1 (here represented as {1}) and the credal
assignment that has minimal accuracy is the one that assigns a precise credence of 0
(here represented as {0}). When the proposition is false, the credal assignment that
has maximal accuracy is the one that assigns a precise credence of 0 and the credal
assignment that has minimal accuracy is the one that assigns a precise credence
of 1.
The third constraint is:
Local Admissibility. If L* is a legitimate imprecise local accuracy measure, then
for two sets of credences R and R*, R* doesn’t strongly accuracy-dominate R,
i.e., it is not the case that L*(R, 0)<L*(R*, 0) and L*(R, 1)<L*(R*, 1).
Just as Probabilistic Admissibility rules out the possibility that one probabilistic
credal state can weakly accuracy-dominate another, Local Admissibility rules out the
possibility that one credal assignment might strongly accuracy-dominate another.17
The motivating intuition here is (roughly) that violations of Local Admissibility
will lead to violations of Probabilistic Admissibility simpliciter. Consider a set of
probability functions C defined over a partition X, which contains a proposition
P such that C(P) = R. Suppose, contrary to Local Admissibility, some R* strongly
accuracy-dominates R given some local measure of accuracy L*. Then we can
construct another set of credence functions C* such that, for any proposition P* in
X other than P, C*(P*) = C(P*), but C*(P) = R*. In any world, for any proposition
P* other than P, the local accuracy of the credal assignments made by C* will be
the same as the local accuracy of the credal assignments made by C, but the local
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accuracy of the credal assignment made by C* to P will always be greater than
that made by C to P. But then, intuitively, it seems that the global accuracy of C*
must be greater than that of C in every world.18 So, C* will accuracy-dominate C.
Since C is a set of probability functions, this will lead to a violation of Probabilistic
Admissibility. Thus, in order to avoid violations of Probabilistic Admissibility we
need to rule out the possibility that some credal assignments R can be locally
accuracy dominated.
The fourth, and most crucial, constraint, is:
Local-Global Connection. Suppose X is a partition over a set of worlds W.
Then,
(i) For any legitimate imprecise global measure of accuracy GX*, there exists
a legitimate imprecise local measure of accuracy L* such that for any two
sets C and C* of credence functions defined over X, and any world w in
W, if L*(C(P),vw(P)) = L*(C*(P),vw(P)) for every proposition P in X, then
GX*(C,w) = GX*(C*,w).
(ii) For any legitimate imprecise local measure of accuracy L*, there exists a
legitimate imprecise global measure of accuracy GX*, such that for any two
sets C and C* of credence functions defined over X, and any world w in
W, if L*(C(P),vw(P)) = L*(C*(P),vw(P)) for every proposition P in X, then
GX*(C,w) = GX*(C*,w).
Most accuracy-centered epistemologists also accept a version of Local-Global Con-
nection restricted to precise credences.19 Local-Global Connection arises out of the
important thought that the global accuracy score of an entire credal state should
depend solely on the accuracy scores of the particular credal assignments that it
makes to various propositions. We want to leave it open precisely how the global
accuracy score arises from the local ones, and only impose two weak constraints
by means of Local-Global Connection. Constraint (i) says that for any legitimate
global accuracy measure, there exists a legitimate local accuracy measure such that
if two credal states make equally accurate credal assignments to each proposition
in a partition according to the local measure, then the global accuracy of the two
states is the same according to the global measure. By contrast, (ii) says that for
any legitimate local accuracy measure, there exists a legitimate global accuracy
measure, such that if two credal states make equally accurate credal assignments
to each proposition in a partition according to the local measure, then the global
accuracy of the two states is the same according to the global measure.
Local Extension, Local Boundedness, Local Admissibility, and Local-Global Con-
nection are the four constraints on measures of accuracy for imprecise credences
that we need to generalize Schoenfield’s argument.
5. The Two Results
In §2, we saw that Schoenfield’s argument against Requirement of Imprecision is not
decisive: it leaves open the possibility that some weaker principles such as Permission
for Imprecision orWeak Requirement of Imprecisionmight still be true. We now show
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that if we pay close attention to the connection between local and global accuracy
measures, these weaker principles won’t succeed either. We prove two results in
this section. The first is directed towards Weak Requirement of Imprecision and
generalizes Schoenfield’s proof to partitions of any number of cells. The second
is directed towards Permission for Imprecision, which shows that some imprecise
credal states, which are predicted to be rational by a natural precisification of
Permission for Imprecision, will always be accuracy-dominated.
5.1 The first result
We can now show that the following claim is true:
Proposition 2. Suppose an imprecise credal state defined over a partition X over a
set of worlds W is represented by a set C of functions in BX. If Local Extension,
Local Boundedness, Local Admissibility, and Local-Global Connection are true, then
there will be a credence function b in BX such that for any legitimate imprecise global
measure of accuracy GX*, GX*(C,w) = GX*({b},w) in every world w.
Proposition 2 shows that, according to certain plausible measures of accuracy,
for any imprecise credal state, there will be a precise credal state which is just
as accurate as that state. This result is simply a generalization of Schoenfield’s
argument. Schoenfield shows that for any imprecise probabilistic credal state defined
over a two-cell partition, there is a precise probabilistic credal state that is just
as accurate. We have shown that, given our constraints, this isn’t just true for
probabilistic imprecise credal states defined over two-cell partitions, but for all
imprecise credal states defined over partitions with any number of cells.
If we accept the Permission Principle, Local Extension, Local Boundedness, Local-
Global Connection, and Local Admissibility, we will end up with the result that
there are no circumstances under which an agent is rationally required to have an
imprecise credal state. Hence, this shows that if the Permission Principle is true,
then Weak Requirement of Imprecision cannot be true: there is no body of evidence
E such that an agent is rationally required to adopt an imprecise credal state in
response to E.
However, one might think that this result still leaves open the possibility that there
are scenarios like MYSTERY COIN, where the non-specificity of the agent’s evidence at
least makes it rationally permissible for her to adopt imprecise credences. In other
words, this result remains compatible with Permission for Imprecision.
5.2 The second result
We will now show that, given our constraints on measures of accuracy, Permission
for Imprecision is problematic as well. According to Permission for Imprecision, if
an agent’s total evidence is non-specific with respect to a partition X, then the agent
is permitted by epistemic rationality to adopt an imprecise credal state. Recall that
an agent’s total evidence with respect to a partition X is non-specific if and only if,
for some non-singleton set of probability functions C, the only evidence an agent
has concerning the propositions in X is that the objective chance function for X is
in C. In a case where an agent’s total evidence is non-specific in this sense, what
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imprecise credal state is the agent rationally permitted to adopt? The most natural
answer is that it’s just the credal state represented by the set of probability functions
C. This yields:
Permission for Imprecision Precisified. For any non-singleton set of probability
functions C, if the only evidence an agent has concerning the propositions in X
is that the objective chance function for X is in C, then the agent is permitted
by epistemic rationality to adopt an imprecise credal state represented by C.
In what follows, we show that some imprecise credal states, which are predicted to
be rationally permissible by Permission for Imprecision Precisified, will always be
accuracy-dominated for any plausible way of measuring the accuracy of imprecise
credal states.
To see why, we need to introduce two more principles. The first is a principle
that most accuracy-centered epistemologists accept.
The Non-Dominance Principle. From an epistemic standpoint, it is rationally
impermissible for an agent to adopt a credal state D if, according to every
legitimate global measure of accuracy, D is weakly-accuracy dominated by some
credal state D*, i.e., for every epistemically possible world, D* is just as accurate
as D, and there exists at least one epistemically possible world w* in W where
D* is more accurate than D.20
The Non-Dominance Principle underlies various central results of accuracy-centered
epistemology, e.g., Joyce’s (1998, 2009) argument for Probabilism and Briggs and
Pettigrew’s (forthcoming) argument for Bayesian conditionalization. As we under-
stand the matter, theNon-Dominance Principle is a minimal commitment about epis-
temic rationality that any accuracy-centered epistemologist should take on board.
So, if there are indeed imprecise credal states that are ruled permissible by Per-
mission for Imprecision Precisified but ruled impermissible by the Non-Dominance
Principle, then Permission for Imprecision Precisified cannot be accommodated
within accuracy-centered epistemology.
The second principle we want introduce is:
The Joycean Constraint. For any partition X over W, if GX is a legitimate global
measure of accuracy for individual credence functions defined over X, then, for
any probabilistically incoherent credence function b defined over X, there is a
probability function p that weakly accuracy-dominates it, i.e., for every world
w in W, GX(b,w)  GX(p,w) and there exists a world w* in W, GX(b,w*) <
GX(p,w*).
We call this the Joycean constraint, since Joyce (1998, 2009) proves this claim
from other assumptions about legitimate accuracy measures in his attempt to
justify Probabilism by appealing to accuracy-based considerations.21 The Joycean
Constraint and the Non-Dominance Principle together imply that if an agent has a
precise credal state, then that doxastic state is rationally permissible only if it is rep-
resentable by a probability function. This gives us a partial defense of Probabilism.
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Using the Joycean Constraint, we can now show that there are certain imprecise
credal states deemed rational by Permission for Imprecision Precisified that violate
the Non-Dominance Principle. Consider the following two cases:
FOUR-SIDED MYSTERY DIE. You have a four-sided die that was made at a factory
where they can make dice of pretty much any bias. You’ve seen dice that always
land on the same side, dice that always land on two sides with a frequency ratio
2:1 and never on the other two sides, etc. You have no idea whatsoever what
bias your particular die has. What should your credence be that when you roll
the die, it will land with side <1> up?
FIVE-SIDED MYSTERY DIE. You have a five-sided die that was made at a factory
where they can make dice of pretty much any bias. You’ve seen dice that always
land on the same side, dice that always land on two sides with a frequency ratio
2:1 and never on the other three sides, etc. You have no idea whatsoever what
bias your particular die has. What should your credence be that when you roll
the die, it will land with side <1> up?
Suppose your credences in these cases are defined over the partitions X =
{P1,P2,P3,P4} and X* = {P1*,P2*,P3*,P4*,P5*} respectively, where any Pi is the
proposition that the four-sided die lands with side <i> facing up, and Pi* is the
proposition that the five-sided die lands with side <i> facing up. Since you have
no idea about the bias of the die, Permission for Imprecision Precisified entails that
it is rationally permissible for you in FOUR-SIDED MYSTERY DIE to adopt an
imprecise credal state represented by the set of probability functions C such that,
for any P in X, C(P) = [0,1]. Similarly, in FIVE-SIDED MYSTERY DIE, it is
rationally permissible for you to adopt a doxastic state represented by the set of
probability functions C* such that, for any P in X*, C*(P) = [0,1].
Now the main idea is this (for details, see the proof of Proposition 3 in the
Appendix). According to Proposition 2, Local Extension, Local Boundedness, Local-
Global Connection, and Local Admissibility guarantee that there is a precise credence
function p such that the credences it assigns to cells in X are just as locally accurate
as the imprecise credal assignments made by C. Likewise, we can construct a
precise credence function p* such that the credences it assigns to the propositions
in X* are just as accurate as the credal assignments made by C*. But it will turn
out that either p or p* must be probabilistically incoherent. Then, by the Joycean
Constraint, either p or p* is weakly accuracy-dominated. But since p is as accurate
as C in every possible world, and p* is as accurate as C* in every possible world,
this means that either C or C* is weakly accuracy-dominated. Thus, it seems that
if the Joycean Constraint is true, some imprecise doxastic states that are allowed
by Permission for Imprecision Precisified violate the Non-Dominance Principle and
hence are irrational. Thus, Permission for Imprecision Precisified is false.
But note that the considerations raised in the preceding paragraph actually show
something stronger: namely, certain probabilistic imprecise credal states will be
accuracy-dominated given our constraints on accuracy measures, and will therefore
violate Probabilistic Admissibility. So, in effect, the following impossibility result
holds:
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Proposition 3. If Extension, Local Extension, Local Boundedness, Local Admissi-
bility, Local-Global Connection, and Probabilistic Admissibility are true, then the
Joycean Constraint is false.
5.3 Summary
Let’s sum up. In this section, we have shown that given certain plausible constraints
on local measures of accuracy, the accuracy-centered epistemologist can accept
neither Weak Requirement of Imprecision nor the most natural precisification of
Permission for Imprecision. If Weak Requirement of Imprecision and Permission for
Imprecision were true, then imprecise credal states would be rationally permissible
to adopt in any situation involving non-specific evidence, and might sometimes even
be required. However, there’s no easy way of reconciling this thesis with accuracy-
centered epistemology.
Note that the defender of imprecise credences cannot get out of this problem by
retreating to the position that some other precisification of Permission for Impre-
cision is true. This is because the impossibility result given by Proposition 3 poses
a dilemma for the accuracy-centered epistemologist who also wants to defend the
rationality of imprecise credences. It shows that if Extension, Local Extension, Lo-
cal Boundedness, Local-Global Connection and Local Admissibility are correct, then
she must either reject the Joycean Constraint or Probabilistic Admissibility. On the
one hand, since the accuracy-centered epistemologist needs the Joycean Constraint
for accuracy-dominance arguments for Probabilism, she cannot reject it without
non-trivial costs. On the other hand, Probabilistic Admissibility is attractive for
the reasons discussed above. Therefore, the upshot of our argument is just that if
our constraints on legitimate measures of accuracy are correct, then there is no
satisfactory method of measuring the accuracy of imprecise credal states. This is
why the consequences of Proposition 3 are much more serious than that of any
other results that we have proved.22 In the remainder of this paper, we will discuss
a few possible responses to our argument.
6. Response 1: Adopting Non-Numerical Measures of Accuracy
Throughout this paper, we have focused on a framework of accuracy-centered epis-
temology which makes use of numerical measures of accuracy, i.e., measures of
accuracy that assign real values to credal states or credal assignments to proposi-
tions. This is precisely why we required that legitimate global and local measures
of accuracy satisfy Boundedness and Local Boundedness, which entail that both
global and local measures of accuracy should output real values. One may reject
this constraint on measures of accuracy. A natural motivation for having non-
numerical measures of accuracy─which Mayo-Wilson and Wheeler (2016) attribute
to James Joyce─is this. One might argue that when an agent’s doxastic attitude to-
wards a proposition is not representable by a real number, then the accuracy of her
credal assignment should similarly not be representable by a real number.23 Since
the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3 depend on Boundedness and Local Boundedness,
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using non-numerical measures of accuracy can help us block result like Propositions
2 and 3.
However, simply using non-numerical measures of accuracy does not by itself
help us reconcile the rationality of imprecise credences with the accuracy-centered
approach to epistemology. This is because a similar (though slightly weaker) result
than Proposition 2 can also be proved for non-numerical measures of accuracy.
We begin with two prima facie attractive constraints on non-numerical measures
of accuracy: Strong Extensionality and Completeness. Consider Strong Extensional-
ity. To state this constraint precisely, we need to introduce the notion of an accuracy
profile. Suppose C is a set of credence functions defined over a partition X. The
accuracy profile of C at a world w is the following multiset:
{{(vw(P),C(P)): PX}}24
In other words, the accuracy profile of C at w contains, for each proposition in
X, the pair consisting of the truth value of that proposition at w, and the set of
credences that C assigns to that proposition. Strong Extensionality says that the
accuracy of C at w is determined entirely by the accuracy profile of C at w. That is:
Strong Extensionality. For any partition X over a set of worlds W, let C and
C* be sets of credence functions in BX. If GX* is a legitimate imprecise global
measure of accuracy, and the accuracy profile of C at w in W is the same as the
accuracy profile of C* at w* in W, then GX*(C,w) = GX*(C*,w*).25
The rationale for Strong Extensionality is that the accuracy of a credal state at a
world should only depend on (i) the truth values at that world of the propositions
over which the credal state is defined and (ii) the values that the credal state
assigns to those propositions. To reject Strong Extensionality is to allow measures
of accuracy to be sensitive to factors other than truth-values of propositions and the
relevant credal assignments, e.g., factors like the informativeness of the propositions.
But why should a measure that assesses solely the accuracy of credal states and not
something else be sensitive to such factors? Thus, rejecting Strong Extensionality is
a bad idea.
The second constraint—Completeness—is more questionable: it says that any
legitimate accuracy measure for imprecise credal states must be such that every
credal state should be comparable with respect to global accuracy with all other
credal states.
Completeness. For any partition X over a set of worlds W, let C and C* be sets
of credence functions in BX. If GX* is a legitimate imprecise global measure of
accuracy, then, for any w in W, either GX*(C,w) > GX*(C*,w) or GX*(C,w) <
GX*(C*,w) or GX*(C,w) = GX*(C*,w).26
Note that Completeness trivially follows from Boundedness (since it would be
true whenever GX* assigns real values), but it is also much weaker. According to
Completeness, any legitimate measure of accuracy should be such that the global
accuracy of one credal state under that rule must either be greater than, less than,
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or equal to the global accuracy of another credal state. Now, this constraint may
indeed be true of non-numerical measures of accuracy.
With these two constraints in place, we can prove the following claim (which
generalizes another result proved by Schoenfield (2015)).
Proposition 4. For any finite partition X over a set of worlds W, let C and C* be sets
of probability functions in BX, such that for any P in X and some set of real numbers
R, C(P) = R and C*(P) = {1/|X|}. If Strong Extensionality, Completeness, and
Probabilistic Admissibility are true, then, for any legitimate imprecise global measure
of accuracy GX* and any world w in W, GX*(C,w) = GX*(C*,w).
Let’s see what this means. Consider the Principle of Indifference, i.e., the principle
that for any finite partition X over a set of worlds W, an agent’s credence in any P
in X (in the absence of evidence that favours any particular P) should be 1/|X|.
According to Proposition 4, any imprecise credal state that assigns an interval
[a,b] to every cell of a finite partition is just as accurate as the precise credal
state recommended by the Principle of Indifference with respect to that partition.
For instance, take the case where X = {FH, FT, BH, BT}. If our evidence is
maximally unspecific about the bias of the coin, the same line of reasoning that
motivates Requirement of Imprecision should also require the agent to adopt an
imprecise credal state that assigns [0,1] to each cell of this extended partition.27 But
Proposition 4, in conjunction with other assumptions, shows that this is false. For if
Completeness, Strong Extensionality, and Probabilistic Admissibility are true, then
the credal state that is mandated by the Principle of Indifference (and therefore
assigns ¼ to each cell in the partition) is just as accurate as the imprecise credal
state in every world. And if the Permission Principle is true, then the agent cannot
be required to adopt either of these two credal states in any world. This immediately
undermines some of the motivation for both Requirement of Imprecision and Weak
Requirement of Imprecision.
Even though Proposition 4 (unlike Propositions 2 and 3) doesn’t straightforwardly
refute Weak Requirement of Imprecision or Permission for Imprecision, it poses a
problem for Weak Requirement of Imprecision.28 In conjunction with Complete-
ness, Strong Extensionality, Probabilistic Admissibility, and the Permission Princi-
ple, Proposition 4 implies that an agent can never be required to adopt an imprecise
credal state that assigns the same set of credences, e.g., an interval [a,b], to every cell
of the partition. Call such imprecise credal states uniform. Proposition 4 (along with
the other constraints) entails that if an agent is ever required to adopt an imprecise
credal state in response to a body of non-specific evidence, the relevant credal state
must be non-uniform. If the defender of Weak Requirement of Imprecision accepts
this claim, she must explain why uniform imprecise credal states should be treated
differently from non-uniform imprecise credal states. In any plausible case of non-
specific evidence, what seems to make an imprecise credal state rationally required
is just the fact that the agent has no information about the propositions contained
in the relevant partition, except for the information that the chance distribution
over that partition lies within a certain set of probability distributions. As long as
that set of probability distributions assigns the same set of real numbers to each
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cell of the partition, we will continue to have the intuition that the agent is required
to adopt a uniform imprecise credal state in that situation. Thus, it just seems ad
hoc to claim that there can be situations of non-specific evidence where an agent is
required to adopt non-uniform credal states, but there can’t be situations of non-
specific evidence where she is required to adopt uniform credal states. In order to
make her account less ad hoc, the defender of imprecise credences would have to
reject Weak Requirement of Imprecision.
The defender of non-numerical measures of accuracy could block this argument
by rejecting either Completeness, or Strong Extensionality, or Probabilistic Admis-
sibility. For now, let’s set aside the question of rejecting Probabilistic Admissibility:
while rejecting Probabilistic Admissibility would block all the results we have proved
so far, it is far from clear whether rejecting it will help the defender of imprecise
credences in this context.29 Now, the non-numerical accuracy measures that have
been proposed in the literature on imprecise credences – e.g., the one proposed by
Seidenfeld, Schervish and Kadane (2012) and another ascribed to James Joyce by
Mayo-Wilson and Wheeler (2016) –violate either Completeness or Strong Exten-
sionality (see Appendix B). We have already explained why rejecting Strong Exten-
sionality is a bad idea. So, the only remaining option for the defender of imprecise
credences would be to adopt measures of accuracy that violate Completeness.
We think rejecting Completeness will not help the defender ofWeak Requirement
of Imprecision. Consider two different probabilistic credal states, represented by
the sets of credence functions C1 and C2 defined over an n-cell partition X, such
that for any P in X, C1(P) = [a,b] and C2(P) = {1/n}. There are two options:
either the defender of Weak Requirement of Imprecision could say that an agent
cannot ever be in a situation of non-specific evidence where adopting the credal
state corresponding to C1 is required by rationality, or she could deny this. The first
option, as we have argued, makes the defense ofWeak Requirement of Imprecision ad
hoc. The second option involves saying that an agent can be required by rationality
to adopt the imprecise credal state represented by C1. But note that if the defender
ofWeak Requirement of Imprecision wants to avoid the consequences of Proposition
4 by denying Completeness, she would have to say that the imprecise credal state
represented by C1 is incomparable with respect to global accuracy to the precise
credal state represented by C2 in every possible world.30 Now, plausibly, if two
credal states are incomparable to each other with respect to global accuracy in
every possible world, then a rational agent cannot regard any one of the credal
states as better than, worse than, or exactly as good as the other given solely the
metric of global accuracy. Then, given solely considerations about global accuracy,
an agent also cannot have any reason to adopt the imprecise credal state over the
precise one.
This raises a challenge for the defender of Weak Requirement of Imprecision.
If she wants to say that an agent can be required by rationality to adopt the
imprecise credal state represented by C1, she must explain, without appealing to
the global accuracy of that credal state, how there could be an accuracy-based
advantage to adopting that credal state. The most natural explanation would be
that the imprecise credal state matches the specificity of the agent’s evidence, while
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the precise credal state doesn’t. But this explanation is not satisfying: it’s unclear
why it is better from an accuracy-centered standpoint to match one’s credal state
to the specificity of one’s evidence. In the absence of a good explanation, Weak
Requirement of Imprecision cannot be saved by rejecting Completeness.
Our argument in this section leaves open the possibility that Permission for
Imprecision can be true from an accuracy-centered standpoint. Therefore, one con-
sequence of our argument is that a defender of imprecise credences who adopts the
strategy of adopting non-numerical accuracy measures can only plausibly accept
Permission for Imprecision but not Weak Requirement of Imprecision. Since a view
of this kind seems quite weak, the defender of imprecise credences might ultimately
have to seek a different way of defending the rationality of imprecise credences
from an accuracy-centered standpoint.
7. Response 2: Rejecting Probabilistic Admissibility
The consequences of Proposition 3 are far more serious than that of any other
results that we have proved so far. As we pointed out above, it shows that given our
constraints on accuracy measures for imprecise credences, there is no measure of
accuracy that respects both the Joycean Constraint and Probabilistic Admissibility.
Since both these principles are attractive from an accuracy-centered standpoint,
this just shows that there is no satisfactory method of measuring the accuracy of
imprecise credal states using numerical accuracy measures. In this section, we will
explore whether a defender of imprecise credences can avoid this consequence by
rejecting Probabilistic Admissibility.
Interestingly, some have in fact been tempted to reject Probabilistic Admissibil-
ity. For instance, Konek (forthcoming) proposes a global accuracy measure which
violates this constraint (see Appendix C). Note that, for the accuracy-centered epis-
temologist, rejecting Probabilistic Admissibility outright is a bad idea, since much of
the work done in accuracy-centered epistemology depends on the idea that precise
probability functions shouldn’t be accuracy-dominated. But perhaps she can adopt
a restricted version of Probabilistic Admissibility instead, such as:
Restricted Probabilistic Admissibility. For any set of worlds W and a partition
X over W, if GX* is a legitimate imprecise global accuracy measure for sets of
credence functions defined over X, then for any probability function p in BX,
there is no set C of credence functions in BX such that p is accuracy-dominated
by C according to GX*.
In other words, there is no set C in BX such that
(i) for every world w in W, GX*({p},w)  GX*(C,w), and
(ii) there exists a world w in W such that GX*({p},w) < GX*(C,w).
Restricted Probabilistic Admissibility preserves the idea that precise credence func-
tions shouldn’t be accuracy-dominated, but it nevertheless avoids the impossibility
result from the preceding section. Importantly, Konek’s global measure of accu-
racy violates not only Probabilistic Admissibility, but also Restricted Probabilistic
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Admissibility (see Appendix C). However, even if it were possible to formulate ac-
curacy measures for imprecise credal states that preserve Restricted Probabilistic
Admissibility, adopting such a weak principle still seems highly problematic to us.
Now, it may be possible to reconcile Permission for Imprecision with accuracy-
centered epistemology by retreating to Restricted Probabilistic Admissibility. How-
ever, this strategy might be reasonable if only a handful of imprecise credal states
were accuracy-dominated in the way Proposition 3 suggests. In such a case, the
defender of imprecise credences might still be able to hold that in most but not all
cases of non-specific evidence, an agent is permitted to have imprecise credences.
But we think that on the view proposed here, it is highly likely that not just some
but most imprecise credal states are accuracy-dominated by some precise credence
function. In order to see this, note that the proof of Proposition 2 is a proof by con-
struction. More specifically, it proceeds by constructing a precise credence function
that is just as accurate as the imprecise credal state by considering in isolation the
appropriate credence that the precise function needs to assign to each proposition
in the relevant partition, so that both the precise and the imprecise states have the
same local accuracy score with respect to each proposition (and then Local-Global
Connection guarantees that this function will be just as accurate globally). But
there is nothing in this procedure that guarantees that the precise credence function
will be probabilistically coherent; for it may well be that all the individual credal as-
signments that the precise function assigns to different propositions in the partition
don’t add up to exactly 1.
One last point: the proof of Proposition 3 shows that if we accept certain con-
straints on legitimate accuracy measures for imprecise credal states and the Joycean
Constraint, some probabilistic imprecise credal states that seem rational in light
of Permission for Imprecision will end up being accuracy-dominated. Now, the
accuracy-centered epistemologist may reject Probabilistic Admissibility and accept
Restricted Probabilistic Admissibility on the ground that only a small number of
probabilistic imprecise doxastic states end up being accuracy-dominated on the re-
sulting view. Still, a problem will persist; for the imprecise credal states that are
ruled out by our constraints look just like all the other credal assignments the de-
fender of imprecise credences endorses. Thus, it seems that if this is the route that
the accuracy-centered epistemologist wants to go, she owes us an independent story
as to which imprecise credal states are irrational, and which are not. Otherwise the
kinds of credal assignments the defender of imprecise credences will endorse will
turn out to be hopelessly unsystematic.
8. Response 3: Rejecting Local-Global Connection
A promising strategy for blocking the arguments for both Propositions 2 and 3
would be to reject Local-Global Connection.31 Local-Global Connection involves
two constraints. According to the first, for any legitimate global accuracy measure,
there exists a legitimate local accuracy measure such that if two credal states make
equally accurate credal assignments to each proposition in a partition according to
the local measure, then the global accuracy of the two states is the same according
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to the global measure. According to the second, for any legitimate local accuracy
measure, there exists a legitimate global accuracy measure, such that if two credal
states make equally accurate credal assignments to each proposition in a partition
according to the local measure, then the global accuracy of the two states is the
same according to the global measure.
Local-Global Connection can lead to problems. We might think that even if the
credal assignments made by two imprecise credal states have the same local accuracy
scores, the global accuracy score of the two states might still differ. Suppose C is a
set of probability functions such that, for any P in X = {H, T}, C(P) = [0.2, 0.8].
Now, take another set of credence functions C* which contains all the probability
functions in C but contains one probabilistically incoherent function b such that,
for any P in X, b(P) = 0.8. But note that for any P in X, C(P) = C*(P). Therefore,
by Local-Global Connection, the global accuracy of C and C* ought to be the same.
This might seem like a bad consequence of Local-Global Connection: if C and C*
have the same global accuracy score, there is no hope for offering an accuracy-
dominance argument for Probabilism with respect to imprecise credal states (i.e.,
for a view that all the credence functions in one’s representor have to be probability
functions). This might lead us to reject Local-Global Connection. If we reject it, we
are able to block Proposition 2 and Proposition 3.
We have two counter-responses. First of all, even if the defender of imprecise
credences rejects Local-Global Connection, it won’t help her block Proposition 4. She
will end up rejecting the Weak Requirement of Imprecision (as shown in §5) as long
as she accepts Completeness, Strong Extensionality, and Probabilistic Admissibility.
Second, Local-Global Connection still seems independently appealing. It’s mo-
tivated by the natural thought that the global accuracy of a doxastic state (which
involves doxastic attitudes towards different propositions) should depend only on
the local accuracy of the doxastic attitudes that it involves. So, if there are two
doxastic states which involve doxastic attitudes that match each other perfectly
with respect to local accuracy, then the two doxastic states should not be more
or less globally accurate than each other. So far, we have had no reason to think
that this principle should fail with respect to precise credal states or with respect
to imprecise probabilistic credal states. This might give us reason to think that the
principle is true across the board. This in turn might give us reason to search for
a different solution to the problem mentioned above. Here is a sketch of such a
solution.
In response to the problem raised above, we ought to concede that when it
comes to imprecise credal states, there is no straightforward accuracy-dominance
argument for Probabilism. This, however, doesn’t mean that there is no accuracy-
based reason for ruling out non-probabilistic credal states like the one represented
by C*. It seems to us that a defender of imprecise credences should accept the
following principle on independent grounds:
Rational Admissibility. An agent is rationally permitted to adopt an imprecise
credal state represented by a set C of credence functions only if C is a rationally
admissible set of credence functions, i.e., for any credence function b in C, there
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is some epistemic situation in which it is rationally permissible for an agent to
adopt b.
This requirement should be intuitively attractive for the defender of imprecise
credences. She should want the credence functions in the representor to be such
that, on receiving more information, it can be rationally permissible for the agent
to adopt each credence function in the representor as her actual credence function.
For example, in MYSTERY COIN, the only credence functions that should be in your
representor ought to be those that you would be permitted to adopt on gaining
more information about the bias of the coin. If this requirement is correct, it
will be enough to rule out the possibility that the non-probabilistic credal states
(represented by sets of credence functions some of which may be probabilistically
incoherent) are ever rationally permissible to adopt. Joyce’s (1998, 2009) accuracy-
dominance argument shows that probabilistically incoherent credence functions
are never rationally permissible to adopt, because they are accuracy-dominated
by some other, coherent function. So, a set of credence functions that contains
probabilistically incoherent credence functions will be rationally inadmissible, and
therefore a credal state represented by such a set of credence functions will be ruled
out by Rational Admissibility.
An apparent cost of Rational Admissibility is that it conflicts with the Permis-
sion Principle. We are saying that an agent may be rationally required to adopt the
probabilistic credal state represented by C over the non-probabilistic credal state
represented by C* even though the global accuracy of C and C* is the same. Given
that we ourselves have relied on the Permission Principle in our argument against
Weak Requirement of Imprecision given in §4.1, the strategy of accepting Rational
Admissibility seems to undermine our own argument. However, this may in fact
indicate that the accuracy-centered epistemologist should accept a different version
of the Permission Principle that is restricted to rationally admissible doxastic states.
As far as we can tell, adopting this more restricted version of the Permission Prin-
ciple doesn’t affect our argument against Weak Requirement of Imprecision. This
is because, for any imprecise probabilistic credal state, Proposition 2 guarantees
that, given our constraints on measures of accuracy, there is another precise credal
state that is just as accurate as the imprecise one. Now, there are two possibilities:
either that precise credal state is probabilistically coherent, or it’s not. If it is prob-
abilistically coherent, then the restricted version of the Permission Principle says
that the agent isn’t required to have that imprecise probabilistic state. If it is not
probabilistically coherent, then by the Joycean Constraint, there is a precise prob-
abilistic credal state that accuracy-dominates it, and therefore accuracy-dominates
the imprecise credal state. In that case, too, the agent isn’t required to have that
imprecise probabilistic state. In either case, Weak Requirement of Imprecision fails.
The upshot is this. While it might be tempting for the defender of imprecise
credences to reject Local-Global Connection in light of certain problems, this isn’t
obviously a viable option. On the one hand, she will still have to deal with the
problems that arose from Proposition 4. On the other hand, given the independent
appeal of Local-Global Connection, other solutions to the relevant problems may
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also be worth pursuing. Moreover, if the defender of imprecise credences were able
to show that our solution from Rational Admissibility doesn’t work and that Local-
Global Connection is ultimately indefensible, that would in itself be a significant
achievement. For it would show that certain initially attractive constraints, like
Local-Global Connection, which accuracy-centered epistemologists happily accept
when it comes to precise credal states, cannot be reconciled at all with the rationality
of imprecise credences.
9. Conclusion
Let us take stock. A central motivation for imprecise credences comes from situ-
ations involving non-specific evidence: for instance, when an agent has no infor-
mation whatsoever about the bias of a coin, it seems that she is permitted, and
perhaps even required, not to assign any sharp credence to the proposition that
the coin will land heads (or tails) when flipped. Some take such scenarios to show
that for any scenario where an agent’s total evidence is non-specific, she is required
by rationality to adopt imprecise credences. We called this view Requirement of
Imprecision.
We began this essay with Schoenfield’s argument against Requirement of Im-
precision. She shows that at least for imprecise probabilistic credal states de-
fined over two-cell partitions, there is always a precise probabilistic credal state
which is just as accurate as the imprecise state in every world. This shows that
accuracy-centered epistemologists cannot accommodate Requirement of Impreci-
sion. However, we showed that even if the defender of imprecise credences rejects
Requirement of Imprecision in light of Schoenfield’s argument, she may still be
able to allow imprecise credal states to be permissible in all situations of non-
specific evidence, and required in some of them. In response, we argued that if
we accept some other plausible constraints on accuracy measures for imprecise
credal states, this possibility is also blocked. Finally, we considered a number
of responses to our argument, each of which involved rejecting one or more of
the constraints that we imposed on measures of accuracy. We went on to ar-
gue that each of these responses involve some intuitive or theoretical costs. The
upshot of our argument, therefore, is that given our constraints, there is no plau-
sible way of measuring the accuracy of imprecise credal states; so, the rationality
of imprecise credences cannot easily be accommodated within accuracy-centered
epistemology.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proposition 1. For any set of worlds W and a two-cell partition X over W, let
C be a set of probability functions in BX (the set of credence functions defined
over X). Then, if Extension, Boundedness, Probabilistic Admissibility, and World-
Invariance are true, then, for any legitimate imprecise global accuracy measure GX*,
there will be a probability function b in BX such that, for any w in W, GX*(C,w) =
GX*({b}, w).
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To prove Proposition 1, we need:
Lemma 1. For any set of worlds W, let X = {H, T} be a partition over W. Then, if
Probabilistic Admissibility andWorld-Invariance are true, for any legitimate imprecise
global accuracy measure GX*, if C and C* are sets of probability functions defined
over X, the following conditional holds:
If (i) for any H-world w, GX*(C,w) = GX*(C*,w), then (ii) for any T-world w*,
GX*(C,w*) = GX*(C*,w*).
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose the conditional is false: (i) is true, but (ii) isn’t. Then,
there exists a T-world w* s.t. either GX*(C,w*) > GX*(C*,w*) or GX*(C,w*) <
GX*(C*,w*). But note that by World-Invariance, if for a T-world w*, GX*(C,w*)
> GX*(C*,w*), then, for every T-world w**, GX*(C,w**) > GX*(C*,w**). In that
case, since (i) is true, C* will be weakly accuracy-dominated and therefore will
violate Probabilistic Admissibility. A similar violation of Probabilistic Admissibility
will occur if, for a T-world w*, GX*(C,w*) < GX*(C*,w*). Therefore, (ii) must be
true. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose an imprecise doxastic state, defined over a par-
tition X = {H,T}, is represented by a set C of probability functions in BX. By
Boundedness, for any H-world w, GX*(C,w) is between 0 and 1. So by the continuity
of GX over the space of probability functions, there is some probability function b
in BX such that GX*(C,w) = GX(b,w). (This follows from the intermediate value the-
orem.) By Extension, it follows that GX*(C,w) = GX*({b},w). By World-Invariance,
it follows that for every H-world w*, GX*(C,w*) = GX*({b},w*). Combining this
with Lemma 1, we get that for every T-world w**, GX*(C,w**) = GX*({b},w**).
Thus, Proposition 1 is proved. 
Proposition 2. Suppose an imprecise credal state, defined over a partition X over a
set of worlds W, is represented by a set C of functions in BX. If Local Extension,
Local Boundedness, Local Admissibility, and Local-Global Connection are true, then
there will be a credence function b in BX such that for any legitimate imprecise global
measure of accuracy GX*, GX*(C,w) = GX*({b},w) in every world w.
To prove Proposition 2, we prove:
Lemma 2. Suppose R is a set of real numbers between 0 and 1 (inclusive), and c is
a real number between 0 and 1 (inclusive). If Local Boundedness, Local Extension,
and Local Admissibility are true, then, for any legitimate local measure of accuracy
L*, L*(R, 1) = L*({c}, 1) iff L*(R, 0) = L*({c}, 0).
Proof of Lemma 2. Now, suppose L*(R, 1) = L*({c}, 1), but either (i) L*(R, 0)
> L*({c}, 0) or (ii) L*(R, 0) < L*({c}, 0). Let (i) be true. By Local Bounded-
ness, L*(R,0) is between 1 and 0 (inclusive). Since L(.,0) is continuous through the
unit interval [0,1], we can find a real number d between 0 and 1 such that L*(R,0) =
L (d, 0) = L*({d},0) (once again, by the intermediate value theorem). But note that
if (i) is true, d is distinct from c. We show that this cannot be the case. There are
two possibilities.
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Possibility 1. Suppose c<d. Then, we pick a real number r between c and d
(exclusive). Then, by Truth-Directedness and Local Extension,
L*(R, 1) = L*({c},1)<L*({r}, 1).
L*(R, 0) = L*({d}, 0)<L*({r}, 0).
But, since {r} strongly accuracy-dominates R, we violate Local Admissibility.
Possibility 2. Suppose c>d. Then, we pick a real number r between d and c
(exclusive).Then, by Truth-Directedness,
L*(R, 1) = L*({c},1)>L*({r}, 1).
L*(R, 0) = L*({d}, 0)>L*({r}, 0).
But, since {r} is strongly accuracy-dominated by R, we violate Local
Admissibility.
So, c = d. But in that case, (i) cannot be true. Similarly, (ii) cannot be true. The
converse is proved exactly in the same way. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let C be a set of probability functions defined over a
partition X over a set of worlds W. Let L* be an arbitrary legitimate local measure
of accuracy.
Consider any world w in W. For any proposition P in X, if w is in P, then the
local accuracy of the credal assignment that C makes to P is L*(C(P),1). By Local
Extension, there exists a legitimate local accuracy measure L of which L* is an
extension. By Local Boundedness, L*(C(P),1) is between 1 and 0 (inclusive). Since
L(.,1) is continuous through the unit interval [0,1], we can find a real number x
between 0 and 1 (inclusive) such that L(x,1) = L*(C(P),1) (by the intermediate
value theorem). Analogously, if w is not in P, then the local accuracy of the credal
assignment that C makes to P is L*(C(P),0). By Local Boundedness, L*(C(P),0)
is between 1 and 0. Since L(.,0) is continuous through the unit interval [0,1], we
can find a real number x between 0 and 1 such that L(x,0) = L*(C(P),0) (by
the intermediate value theorem). Therefore, for any P in X, there exists a real
number x between 0 and 1 (inclusive) such that L*(C(P), vw(P)) = L*({x}, vw(P)).
This entails that there exists a credence function b, such that for any P in X,
L*(C(P), vw(P)) = L*({b(P)}, vw(P)). In other words, there exists a credence
function b such that for any proposition P in X, the credal assignment made by b
to P is just as locally accurate in w as the credal assignment made by C to P.
Now, consider any world w* such that ww*. There are two possibilities: either
w and w* belong to the same cell of the partition X, or they don’t.
Possibility 1. If w and w* belong to the same cell of the partition X, then w*
will assign the same truth-values to propositions in X as w; so, for any P in X,
vw(P) = vw*(P). Hence, for any proposition P and any credence function b such
that L*(C(P), vw(P)) = L*({b(P)}, vw(P)), it will be the case that L*(C(P),
vw*(P)) = L*({b(P)}, vw*(P)).
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Possibility 2. If w and w* don’t belong to the same cell of the partition X,
then there exist exactly two propositions P and P* in X such that w is in P
but not in P*, whereas w* is in P* but not in P. Therefore, vw(P)  vw*(P)
and vw(P*)  vw*(P*). According to Lemma 2, however, for any sets of cre-
dences R and {c}, L*(R,1) = L*({c},1) iff L*(R,0) = L*({c},0). So, whatever P
and P* may be, if L*(C(P),vw(P)) = L*({b(P)},vw(P)) and L*(C(P*),vw(P*))
= L*({b(P*)},vw(P*)), then L*(C(P),vw*(P)) = L*({b(P)},vw*(P)) and
L*(C(P*),vw*(P*)) = L*({b(P*)},vw*(P*)).
This entails that for any w inW and any P in X, L*(C(P),vw(P)) = L*({b(P)},vw(P)).
Since L* is any arbitrary legitimate local accuracy measure, by Local-Global Con-
nection, it follows that for any legitimate global measure of accuracy GX*, GX*(C,w)
= GX* ({b},w). 
Proposition 3. If Extension, Local Extension, Local Boundedness, Local Admissi-
bility, Local-Global Connection, and Probabilistic Admissibility are true, then the
Joycean Constraint is false.
Proof of Proposition 3. We prove this proposition for the general case. Let X =
{P1, . . . ,Pn} and X* = {P1*, . . . , Pn+1*}, both defined over the same set of worlds
W. Let C represent a probabilistic imprecise doxastic state defined over X, such
that for any P in X, C(P) = [0,1]. Similarly, let C* represent a probabilistic imprecise
credal state defined over X*, such that for any P in X*, C*(P) = [0,1].
By the proof of Proposition 2, if Local Extension, Local Boundedness, and
Local Admissibility are true, we can show that for any legitimate local measure of
accuracy L*, there exists a precise credence function b such that for any w inW and
any proposition P in X, L*(C(P),vw(P)) = L*({b(P)},vw(P)) for all propositions
P in X. Suppose, now, we construct a credence function b* such that for any Pi in
X and Pi* in X* where i is between 1 and n (inclusive), b*(Pi*) = b(Pi). However,
for the proposition Pn+1*, we let b*(Pn+1*) = r such that L*(C*(Pn+1*),vw(Pn+1*))
= L*({r},vw(Pn+1*)) for all w in W. That there will be such an r is guaranteed by
Local Extension, Local Boundedness, and Lemma 2. Note that due to Local-Global
Connection, this guarantees that for any w in W and for any legitimate global
measure of accuracy GX**, GX**(C*,w) = GX**({b*},w).
Now, we show that we are bound to get a violation of Probabilistic Admissibility
in this case if the Joycean Constraint is true.
Possibility 1. Suppose b is a probability function; then PX b(P) = 1. But now
consider PX* b*(P). Since b* assigns the same values to the first n cells in X* as
b does to the first n cells in X, we have PX* b*(P) = PX b(P)+b*(Pn+1*) =
1+r. Here, there are two possibilities: either r>0 or r = 0.
Possibility 1.1. If r>0, b* is probabilistically incoherent. Then, by the Joycean
Constraint, according to any legitimate precise global accuracy measure GX*,
there is a probability function that weakly accuracy-dominates b*. By Extension,
since GX** is an extension of a legitimate accuracy score GX*, according to GX**,
C* is accuracy-dominated by a precise credal state. Thus, we get a violation of
Probabilistic Admissibility.
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Possibility 1.2. Now, consider the possibility that r = 0. Let L* be any arbitrary
local accuracy measure for imprecise credences. By Local Boundedness and Local
Extension, L*({r},1) = 0 and L*({r},0) = 1. Now, since C*(Pn+1*) = [0,1] and
the local accuracy score of {r} and C*(Pn+1*) is the same relative to any truth-
value, L*([0,1],0) = L*({0},0) = 1 and L*([0,1],1) = L*({0},1) = 0. Consider the
credence function b** such that for any P in X*, b**(P) = 0. Since for any P in
X*, C*(P) = [0,1], this means that for any P in X*, the local accuracy score of
{b**(P)} and C*(P) will be the same relative to any truth-value. By Local-Global
Connection, this implies that for any w in W, GX**(C*,w) = GX*({b**},w). Since
b** is not a probability function, using the Joycean Constraint, we get the result
that there exists a probability function that weakly accuracy-dominates b**. This
means that C* is accuracy-dominated. Thus, we get a violation of Probabilistic
Admissibility.
Possibility 2. If b is not a probability function, using the Joycean constraint,
we get the result that there exists a probability function that weakly accuracy-
dominates b, and therefore weakly accuracy-dominates C. Again, we get a vio-
lation of Probabilistic Admissibility. 
Proposition 4. For any finite partition X over a set of worlds W, let C and C* be sets
of probability functions in BX, such that for any P in X, C(P) = [a,b] and C*(P) =
{1/|X|}. If Strong Extensionality, Completeness, and Probabilistic Admissibility are
true, then, for any legitimate imprecise global measure of accuracyGX* and any world
w in W, GX*(C, w) = GX*(C*,w).
Proof of Proposition 4. Strong Extensionality implies that, for any two worlds w
and w*, GX*(C, w) = GX*(C,w*) and GX*(C*, w) = GX*(C*,w*). This is because
C and C* have the exact same accuracy profile in each world, since they assign
[a,b] and 1/|X| respectively to the true propositions in every world w, as well as
to all the false ones. Now pick one particular world w, and suppose that GX*(C,
w) > GX*(C*, w). Then C* is more accurate than C in every other world w*,
so C* weakly accuracy-dominates C. But this violates Probabilistic Admissibility.
The same argument applies if we have GX*(C, w) < GX*(C*, w). Thus if we want
to avoid a violation of Probabilistic Admissibility, we need to have GX*(C, w) =
GX*(C*, w) for every world w. 
Appendix B: Non-Numerical Measures of Accuracy
We want to consider two distinct proposals that lay down non-numerical measures
of accuracy for imprecise credal states.
The first proposal is one that Mayo-Wilson and Wheeler (2016) attribute to
Joyce.
Proposal 1. For any partition X over a set of worlds W, let GX be a legitimate
global accuracy measure for precise credal states. Then, there exists a legitimate
global accuracy measure GX* for imprecise credal states such that:
For any world w in W and any set C of credence functions in BX, GX*(C, w) =
{r: b (b  C & GX(b, w) = r)}.
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On this picture, the accuracy score of an imprecise credal state is just the set
of accuracy scores assigned to the individual credence functions that it involves.
The problem with this proposal is that it doesn’t obviously satisfy Completeness.
Suppose there are two sets of probability functions C and C* defined over a two–
cell partition {H, T}, such that C(H) = C(T) = [0.2,0.8], and C*(H) = C*(T) =
[0.3,0.7]. Now, since C* is a subset of C, for any w, GX*(C*, w) will also be a subset
of GX*(C, w). But how do we know which set of accuracy scores is greater than
the other? Since there is no natural total preorder over sets of real numbers, it is
not obvious that imprecise credal states on this view have to be comparable to each
other with respect to global accuracy. Thus, Completeness may indeed fail.
However, this isn’t the only way we could have non-numerical measures of accu-
racy. Seidenfeld, Schervish, and Kadane (2012) define a local measure of inaccuracy
I where, for any x and y between 0 and 1 (inclusive), I([x,y],1) reflects the inac-
curacy of assigning the set of credences [x,y] to a proposition P when P is true,
and I([x,y],0) reflects the inaccuracy of assigning [x,y] to a proposition P when P is
false. The inaccuracy measure I is defined as follows:
I([x,y],0) = <1+x2,y2>
I([x,y],1) = <(1-x)2,(1-y)2+1>
Let I([x,y], 0)<I([w,v], 0) iff either (i) 1+x2<1+w2 or (ii) 1+x2 = 1+w2 and y2<v2.
And let I([x,y], 1)<I([w,v], 1) iff either (i) (1-x)2<(1-w)2 or (ii) (1-x)2 = (1-w)2 and
(1-y)2+1<(1-v)2+1. This local measure of inaccuracy is lexicographic because it
ranks one assignment [w,v] higher than another [x,y] one just in case either the first
term in the score of [w,v] is greater than the first term in the score of [x,y] or if the
first term in the scores of [x,y] and [w,v] are equal, but the first term in the score of
[w,v] is greater than the first term in the score of [x,y].
On the basis of this inaccuracy measure, Seidenfeld et al (2012) proposed a global
measure of inaccuracy. For any partition X = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} defined over a set
of worlds W, IX is a global measure of inaccuracy, such that for any set of credence
functions C defined over X, and any world w in W, IX(C, w) = <I(C(P1), vw(P1)),
I(C(P2), vw(P2)), . . . , I(C(Pn), vw(Pn))>. Now, we can say that IX(C, w)> IX(C*,
w) iff either I(C(P1), vw(P1))> I(C*(P1), vw(P1)), or I(C(P1), vw(P1)) = I(C*(P1),
vw(P1)) and I(C(P2), vw(P2))>I(C*(P2), vw(P2)), or . . . , and so on.
In effect, Seidenfeld et al.’s proposal is this:
Proposal 2. For any partition X over a set of worlds W, there exists a legitimate
imprecise global measure of accuracy GX* such that:
If C and C* are sets of credence functions defined over X, then, for any world
w in W, GX*(C, w)> GX*(C*, w) iff IX*(C, w)< IX*(C*, w), and GX*(C, w) =
GX*(C*, w) iff IX*(C, w) = IX*(C*, w).
But this proposal is incompatible with Strong Extensionality. Take a two-cell par-
tition X = {H,T}, and let there be a set of probability functions C defined over X,
such that for any P in X, C(P) = [0.5., 0.5]. Note that I([0.5,0.5], 0) = <1.25,0.25>
and I([0.5,0.5], 1) = <0.25,1.25>. So, for anyH-world w, IX(C,w) = <<0.25,1.25>,
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<1.25,0.25>>. And, for any T-world w, IX(C,w) = <<1.25,0.25>, <0.25,1.25>>.
Note that C has the same accuracy profile in every world. But since GX(C,w) is not
equal to GX(C, w*) for every w and w*, Strong Extensionality fails.
Appendix C: Konek’s Rejection of Probabilistic Admissibility
Lastly, we want to show that the global measure of inaccuracy Konek (forthcoming)
puts forward leads to a violation of Probabilistic Admissibility. For Konek, the
inaccuracy of any set of credence functions C defined over a partition X in a world
w is given by:
IX ∗ (C, w) = α.IX (a, w) + (1 − α) .IX (b, w) ,
where a is the credence function with the lowest inaccuracy score in w, and b is the
credence function with the highest score in w according to the inaccuracy measure
IX (which is just a global measure of inaccuracy based on the Brier score).
Importantly, Konek also proposes that α>½ in order to reflect the fact that the
agent values avoiding error more than seeking truth. Suppose now that X = {H,T}.
Let C1 be a set of probability functions such that for any P in X, C1(P) = [0,1].
Let C2 be a set of probability functions such that for any P in X, C2(P) = {0.5}.
Finally, let C3 be a set of probability functions such that for any P in X, C3(P) =
[0.2, 0.8].
Now let us calculate the inaccuracy scores IX* assigns to these three sets of
credence functions. In C2, the most inaccurate credence function is the same as the
least accurate one. So, in any w in W,
(i) IX ∗ (C2, w) = α.(1/2((1 − 0.5)2 + (0.5 − 0)2)) + (1 − α).(1/2((1 − 0.5)2
+ (0.5 − 0)2)) = 0.25
Note two things.
(1) At anyH-world w, the least inaccurate credence function inC1 is the credence
function a1 where a1(H) = 1 and a1(T) = 0, and the most inaccurate credence
function in C1 is b1 where b1(H) = 0 and b1(T) = 1. And the least inaccurate
function in C3 is the function a3 where a3(H) = 0.8 and a3(T) = 0.2, and
the most inaccurate credence function is b3 where b3(H) = 0.2 and
b3(T) = 0.8.
(2) Analogously, at any T-world w*, the least inaccurate credence function in
C1 is the credence function b1 mentioned above, and the most inaccurate
credence function in C1 is a1 mentioned above. Similarly, the least inaccurate
function in C3 is the function b3 mentioned above, and the most inac-
curate credence function is a3 mentioned above.
Then, for any w in W,
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(ii) IX ∗ (C1, w)= α.(1/2((1 − 1)2 + (0 − 0)2)) + (1 − α).(1/2((1 − 0)2
+ (0 − 1)2)) = (1 − α)
(iii) IX ∗ (C3, w)= α.(1/2((1 − 0.8)2 + (0.2 − 0)2)) + (1 − α).(1/2((1 − 0.2)2
+ (0.8 − 0)2))
= 0.04α + 0.64 − 0.64α
= 0.64 − 0.6α
Now notice the following: for any α>0.75, C1 accuracy-dominates C2, and, for any
α<0.75, C2 accuracy dominates C1. Lastly, for α = 0.75, C3 accuracy-dominates
both C1 and C2. This means that a violation of Probabilistic Admissibility is in-
escapable on this view.
In fact, Konek’s rule will also violate Restricted Probabilistic Admissibility when
α>0.5. In order so see this, consider the accuracy scores IX* assigns to the doxastic
state C4 which assigns [0.45,0.55] to each cell in X. In particular, for each world
w,
(iv) IS ∗ (C4, w)= α.(1/2((1 − 0.55)2 + (0 − 0.45)2)) + (1 − α).(1/2((1 − 0.45)2
+ (0 − 0.55)2))
= α.0.2025 + (1 − α).(0.3025)
= 0.3025 − α.0.1025
Note that for α > 0.53, IX ∗ (C4, w) = 0.248175 < 0.25 = IX ∗ (C2, w) for each
world w. In other words, C4 accuracy-dominates the precise probabilistic belief state
C2. Note that we need Restricted Probabilistic Admissibility to be true in order for
Joyce’s accuracy-dominance argument for Probabilism to go through. Hence, if we
want to preserve that argument, we should reject Konek’s inaccuracy measure for
imprecise credal states.32
Notes
1 See, e.g., Howson and Urbach (2006), Bovens and Hartmann (2003), and Talbott (2016).
2 See, e.g., Jeffrey (1983), and van Fraassen (1990). Also, see Pfeifer and Kleiter (2007), Wallsten and
Budescu (1995), Smithson and Pushkarskaya (forthcoming) for applications of imprecise probabilities
to psychology, linguistic processing and neurological responses to ambiguity and conflict.
3 See e.g. Levi (1974,1980, 1985), Walley (1991), Joyce (2005, 2010), Weatherson (ms.), Sturgeon
(2008), Ha´jek & Smithson (2012), and Moss (2014). For a survey of some of the different arguments for
having imprecise credences, see Bradley (2016).
4 A case like MYSTERY COIN is discussed by Joyce (2010, p. 283); this particular case is discussed by
Schoenfield (2015) and Carr (2015).
5 In other words, if, given your evidence, it is possible that the objective chance of the coin landing
heads is ¾, then ¾ should be in the set of credences that you assign to the proposition that the coin will
land heads.
6Permission for Imprecision follows fromRequirement of Imprecisionwhen we assume that any credal
state that is rationally required must also be rationally permissible. Weak Requirement of Imprecision
follows when we assume that there are some sets of propositions X, with respect to which an agent can
have the relevant kind of non-specific evidence.
7 See, e.g., Joyce (2009) and Pettigrew (2016).
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8 For accuracy-based arguments for Probabilism, see Joyce (1998, 2009), Leitgeb and Pettigrew
(2010), and Pettigrew (2016). For arguments for Conditionalization, see Greaves and Wallace (2006),
Easwaran (2013), and Briggs and Pettigrew (forthcoming).
9 A credence function defined over a partition X on W will assign a real number between 0 and 1
(inclusive) to every cell of W. A probability function defined over a partition X is a credence function
defined over X such that the values it assigns to the cells in X sum to 1.
10 Joyce (2009) defends a restricted version of Probabilistic Admissibility for precise probability
functions under the label of Coherent Admissibility.
11 One assumption of this argument is that if a credal state is weakly accuracy-dominated, then it
cannot be rationally permissible for an agent to adopt it. Some writers such as Pettigrew (2013) deny this
assumption: they argue that we aren’t rationally required to avoid dominated options, but rather options
that are dominated by non-dominated options. This is what Pettigrew calls Undominated Dominance.
Even though our present argument for Probabilistic Admissibility doesn’t straightforwardly succeed with
Undominated Dominance, we can still construct a slightly more fleshed out argument that is compatible
with this principle. It goes like this.
Suppose a probabilistic credal state represented by a set of probability functionsC is weakly accuracy-
dominated by another credal state represented by a set of credence functions C*. Also, suppose the state
represented by C is rationally permissible, because the only evidence that the agent has regarding the
relevant partition is that the objective chance function for the relevant partition could be any of the
probability functions belonging to C. Note that the following principle seems to be true: if a credal state
C is rationally permissible, and C* weakly accuracy-dominates C, then C* is rationally permissible. Now,
either the state represented by C* is probabilistic or it’s not. If it is non-probabilistic, then the principle
in question yields the conclusion that the credal state represented by C* is rationally permissible in some
situation despite being non-probabilistic. This is a bad result. Moreover, even if the state represented
by C* is probabilistic, then there is no reason why C* must be rationally permissible. For there might
be some objective chance distribution p in C* which the agent’s evidence rules out, or there might be
some chance distribution p which C* doesn’t contain but the agent’s evidence doesn’t rule out. In either
case, intuitively, the credal state given by C* will be rationally impermissible for the agent to adopt. But
note that one of these possibilities has to be true if C* is distinct from C. Therefore, if C represents a
probabilistic credal state, it cannot be weakly accuracy-dominated by another state represented by C*
(whether or not that latter state is itself dominated).
12 Schoenfield doesn’t use World-Invariance in her proof, because she doesn’t make the distinction
between the set of worlds W and the partition X over that set. As a result, she does not evaluate the
accuracy of credence functions or sets of credence functions at worlds in W, but rather at propositions
within the relevant partition X. Since we do not do this, we needWorld-Invariance in order to reconstruct
her proof of Proposition 1.
13 Schoenfield (2015, p. 5). This constraint is also subject to an objection similar to the Bronfman
objection to the Non-Dominance Principle that we discuss later. See footnote 20.
14 The proof of Proposition 1, along with all other proofs, is given in the appendix.
15 Joyce (2009) explicitly defends Strict Immodesty as a desirable property of global measures of
accuracy for precise credal states. See also Oddie (1997), Greaves and Wallace (2006), and Gibbard
(2008).
16 This version of Truth-Directedness is also accepted by other authors, such as Mayo-Wilson and
Wheeler (2016) .
17 Note that Local Admissibility could be strengthened by making the relevant kind of dominance
weak dominance but we only need this weaker constraint.
18 The reasoning here importantly presupposes a principle similar to the constraint called Local-
Global Connection that we discuss below. According to this principle, for any legitimate imprecise local
measure of accuracy L*, there exists a legitimate imprecise global measure of accuracy GX*, such that
for any two sets C and C* of credence functions defined over X, and any world w inW, if L*(C(P),vw(P))
 L*(C*(P),vw(P)) for every proposition P in X and L*(C(P*),vw(P*))>L*(C*(P*),vw(P*)) for some
proposition P* in X, then GX*(C,w)>GX*(C*,w). This principle is motivated by the same considera-
tions that motivate Local-Global Connection, and we think that everything that we say in defense of
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Local-Global Connection in this section and §7 will equally apply to this principle. So, anyone who
accepts Local-Global Connection should also be fine with this variant.
19 For example, Pettigrew (2016) defends a principle called Additivity, and Joyce (2009) endorses
a principle called Separability, both of which entail (i). However, an advantage of the Local-Global
Connection over Additivity and Separability is that the latter two constraints entail that accuracy is not a
dependent good, i.e., the manner in which a particular credence in a particular proposition contributes
to the accuracy of the agent’s total doxastic state doesn’t depend on what other credences she has in
other propositions. But Local-Global Connection doesn’t require us to accept anything as strong as that.
20 This principle is in fact controversial. On the one hand, it is subject to what has come to be
known as the Bronfman objection: Bronfman (ms.) argues that a doxastic state needn’t be rationally
impermissible to adopt merely because it is dominated by some other doxastic state on every legitimate
accuracy measure; for there might not be any one doxastic state which dominates it on every legitimate
accuracy measure. For a reply, see Pettigrew (2016). On the other hand, it is also attacked by Pettigrew
(2013) who defends Undominated Dominance instead. See, for discussion, footnote 11. Note that our
argument here will go through even with Undominated Dominance; for we show in our proof of Propo-
sition 3 that some imprecise probabilistic credal states are accuracy-dominated by probabilistic precise
credal states. Since probabilistic credal states are not dominated by other credal states (by Probabilistic
Admissibility), the relevant imprecise credal states will be ruled out by Undominated Dominance.
21 Also, see Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010), and Pettigrew (2016).
22Proposition 3 also undermines plausible views that recognize epistemic values besides accuracy,
but nevertheless want to admit that accuracy is an important goal of credences. One example of such
a view is the one developed by Mayo-Wilson and Wheeler (2016) who hold that while considerations
of accuracy don’t favor imprecise credences in such situations as MYSTERY COIN, the fact that they fit
better with the unspecific nature of the agent’s evidence is a reason to adopt these credences in cases
when precise credences and imprecise credences fare equally well with respect to accuracy. Proposition 3
undermines their argument because it shows that at least some seemingly rational imprecise credal
states are accuracy-dominated by precise ones, and therefore don’t fare equally well as those precise
states with respect to accuracy.
23We discuss two proposals of this kind in Appendix B.
24 A multiset is a collection that, unlike a set, allows multiple instances of its elements. For example,
{a,a,b} and {a,b} are different multisets. However, order does not matter, so {a,a,b} and {a,b,a} are the
same multiset.
25 Pettigrew (2016) and Schoenfield (2015) accept Strong Extensionality.
26 Our statement of this constraint involves some abuse of notation. Presumably, the greater than
relation denoted by ‘>’ only holds between numerical values. However, we are assuming that it also
holds between non-numerical values. However, this use of notation is harmless, since we could restate
everything we have said using a different greater than relation denoted by ’ ’.
27 Note that someone who wants to allow for the rationality of a credal state that assigns [0,1] to
each cell of a partition may face other problems, e.g., those discussed by Rinard (2013). However, the
problem we are raising doesn’t depend on the fact that the agent assigns [0,1] to each cell of a four-cell
partition; the problem could arise even if the assignment were [0.1., 0.7].
28 An additional problem might be that Proposition 4 (along with the Permission Principle, Com-
pleteness, Strong Extensionality, and Probabilistic Admissibility) implies that the Principal Principle is
false (see also Schoenfield (2015)). In order to see why this is so, consider two different probabilistic
credal states, represented by the sets of credence functions C1 and C2 defined over an n-cell partition X,
such that for any P in X, C1(P)=[0,1] and C2(P)={1/n}. Now, suppose an agent has conclusive evidence
that the objective chance of any P in X is 1/n. So, she is required by the Principal Principle to adopt the
credal state represented by C2 in this scenario (provided that she doesn’t possess any inadmissible infor-
mation). But, given Proposition 4, Completeness, Strong Extensionality, and Probabilistic Admissibility,
both these credal states are equally accurate in every world. Therefore, Proposition 4, Completeness,
Strong Extensionality, and Probabilistic Admissibility (together with the Permission Principle) conflict
with the Principal Principle.
However, we suspect that this problem may not ultimately be unsurmountable. Here is a possible
strategy. If the agent adopts an imprecise credal state in a scenario where she has conclusive evidence
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about what the chance distribution over the relevant partition is, a number of credence functions in the
representor (i.e., the set of credence functions that represents her credal state) will violate the Principal
Principle, so the overall imprecise state will also be irrational. (In the next section, we give a similar
argument for ruling out the rationality of non-probabilistic imprecise credal states by appealing to a
principle called Rational Admissibility. We argue that since the set of credence functions that represents
a non-probabilistic imprecise credal state contains probabilistically incoherent credence functions, and
probabilistically incoherent credence functions are rationally impermissible to adopt for accuracy-based
reasons, such non-probabilistic imprecise credal states are rationally impermissible to adopt even though
they match other probabilistic credal states with respect to global accuracy.) Assuming that there are
accuracy-based arguments for the Principal Principle (e.g., the ones discussed by Pettigrew (2012, 2016)),
we could indeed show that there is some accuracy-based disadvantage to adopting an imprecise credal
state which is represented by a set of credence functions that are not all compatible with the Principal
Principle.
29 In this context, rejecting Probabilistic Admissibility could be counter-productive. Consider two
different probabilistic credal states, represented by the sets of credence functions C1 and C2 defined over
an n-cell partition X, such that for any P in X, C1(P)=[a,b] and C2(P)={1/n}. Proposition 4 (along
with the other constraints) entails that these two credal states have the same global accuracy score in
every world. If the defender of imprecise credence rejects Probabilistic Admissibility in this context, she
would have to allow one of the credal states to strongly accuracy-dominate the other. If the imprecise
credal state accuracy-dominates the other state, then, by the Non-Dominance Principle, she will now be
committed to claim that from an accuracy-centered standpoint, it is never rationally permissible for an
agent to adopt a probabilistically coherent credal state that assigns 1/n to each cell of an n-cell partition.
But there are cases where the Principal Principle will require such a credal state, so that seems bad.
If the precise credal state accuracy-dominates the other state, then, by the Non-Dominance Principle,
the defender of imprecise credences will now be committed to claim that from an accuracy-centered
standpoint, it is never rationally permissible for an agent to adopt a probabilistically coherent credal
state that assigns an interval [a,b] to all the cells of an n-cell partition. This will be inconsistent with the
natural precisification of Permission for Imprecision that we discussed in §4.2, thus leaving some of the
problems for the defender of imprecise credences intact.
30 Here is why. Each of these two credal states has the same accuracy profile in every possible world
and therefore, by Strong Extensionality, they have the same global accuracy score in every world. Hence,
if the defender of imprecise credences wants to avoid violations of Probabilistic Admissibility, she must
say either that they match each other with respect to global accuracy in every world or that they are
incomparable everywhere. Since the first option is bad for reasons discussed earlier, the defender of
imprecise credences must say that they are incomparable with respect to global accuracy in every world.
31 Recall that the motivation for Local Admissibility also appeals to similar considerations. So, if we
reject Local-Global Connection, we may also have to reject Local Admissibility.
32Acknowledgements: The authors would like to thankMalcolm Forster, Daniel Kokotajlo, Matthew
Kotzen, Lu Teng, audiences at the NYU Shanghai Epistemology Reading Group, and especially an
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